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THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
APPLIES TO INDIAN TRIBES: A REPLY TO
PROFESSOR JENSEN
James A. Poore H1*
I. INTRODUCTION
In this issue of the Montana Law Review, Professor Erik M.
Jensen challenges my initial article, describing it as "an
enjoyable flight of fancy."1 He also describes the position that
the Constitution applies to Indian tribes as "dead wrong."2
Needless to say, I disagree. Since Professor Jensen had
some fun with my article, it is only fair that I have some fun
with his. One of my legal mentors, who had a master's degree in
taxation from Harvard, advised me that logic applied to all areas
of law, except tax law. Professor Jensen, who teaches and writes
about Indian law, also teaches and writes in the area of
taxation.3 He would add Indian law to the list of those areas of
the law where logic does not apply.4 Things are the way they
are, because that is the way they are. Actually, what Professor
Jensen says is "the way Felix Cohen described things is the way
they are."5
I recognize that the Supreme Court has not directly held
that the Constitution of the United States applies to Indian
tribes. If it had, we would not be writing these articles. But the
basis of my initial article was that application of the
. Partner, Poore & Hopkins, PLLP, Missoula, Montana; J.D., University of Montana
1968; B.A., Stanford University 1965.
1. Erik M. Jensen, The Continuing Vitality of Tribal Sovereignty Under the
Constitution, 60 MONT. L. REV. 3 (1999).
2. Id. at 16.
3. See, e.g., Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of "Direct Taxes": Are
Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334 (1997); The Unanswered
Question in Tufts: What Was the Purchaser's Basis?, 10 VA. TAX REV. 455 (1991).
4. Despite his disclaimer that "I don't mean to suggest that logic plays no role
(and no, I'm not going to cite Holmes on the insignificance of logic in the law)." Jensen,
supra note 1, at 6 n.15.
5. Jensen, supra note 1, at 5-6.
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Constitution to Indian tribes flows logically from the
Constitution, acts of Congress, and the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States.
What Professor Jensen contends, however, is that logic does
not get us anywhere with respect to this issue.6 Professor
Jensen notes "I'm not going to cite Holmes on the insignificance
of logic in the law,"7 but then says "[1]ife and the law are full of
anomalies that won't satisfy a logician. So what?"8
To respond in the words of Justice Black:
[when] Justice Holmes [commented] that "[t]he life of the law has
not been logic: it has been experience,' Justice Holmes was not
there talking about the Constitution; he was talking about the...
common law...."9
I suggest that the cornerstone of constitutional law is
reasoning or logic.
As Mr. Chief Justice Taney commented more than a century ago, a
constitutional decision of this Court should be 'always open to
discussion when it is supposed to have been founded in error, (so)
that (our) judicial authority should hereafter depend altogether on
the force of the reasoning by which it is supported." °
Certainly, it was Chief Justice Marshall's logic in Marbury
v. Madison," not the exact language of the Constitution, which
led to judicial review of legislation to determine its
constitutionality. 12 It was the power of that logic which framed
this country's constitutional law. 13
In this second article, in light of Professor Jensen's
comments, I revisit the issue of whether the Constitution of the
United States applies to Indian tribes. In my initial article, I
6. Professor Jensen concedes "anyone can knock logical holes in the idea that
tribes are sovereign. Poore does that job perfectly well." Jensen, supra note 1, at 5.
7. Jensen, supra note 1, at 6 n.15.
8. Jensen, supra note 1, at 6.
9. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 642 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
10. Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 614 U.S. 600, 628 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)
(quoting Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 470 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting)).
11. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
12. Jean Edward Smith suggests that Chief Justice Marshall's reasoning (logic) in
Marbury was what kept a potentially hostile Congress from challenging the decision.
See JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 325 (1996).
13. Not everyone agrees with the logic of Marbury. See Jensen, supra note 1, at 11
n.39.
Vol. 60
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recognized that Talton v. Mayes14 implies that the Constitution
does not apply to Indian tribes, but I did not challenge the
decision itself.15 In this article, I question whether Talton was
correctly decided. 16 Again I address the issue of tribal member
citizenship and constitutional protections, and again I reach the
conclusion that the power of Indian tribal government is limited
by the Constitution of the United States. The Constitution
itself, and the obligation of the United States and Congress to
citizens of the United States, Indian citizens and non-Indian
citizens, compel the result that the Constitution applies to
Indian tribes. 7 The logic and reasoning compelling this result
flow initially from Chief Justice Marshall's decisions with
respect to the essential nature of the Constitution.
II. TALTON REVISITED
According to the "logic" of Talton v. Mayes, sovereignty was
not "operated upon" by the Constitution because the sovereignty
of tribes preceded the adoption of the Constitution. 8 It may be
argued that Talton was wrongly decided.
For Talton to be valid, it was necessary for the Supreme
Court to assume that tribes retain sovereignty after tribes and
tribal territory were incorporated into the United States. It was
also necessary for the Court to assume that once tribes became
part of the United States, Congressional action was required to
impose the Constitution on tribes.
The Constitution itself and other constitutional cases of the
Supreme Court, both before and after Talton, make it clear that
neither premise is correct. The Supreme Court has held in
several cases that tribes are not sovereign at all.' 9 The Court
14. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
15. See James A. Poore, III, The Constitution of the United States Applies to Indian
Tribes, 59 MONT. L. REV. 51, 52 (1998).
16. Professor Jensen acknowledges that some case law would indicate that tribes
are not sovereign. See Jensen, supra note 1, at 7 n.20 (discussing United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886)).
17. Professor Jensen, on the other hand, does not think citizenship makes a
difference. See Jensen, supra note 1, 14 & nn.59-62 and accompanying text.
18. See Talton, 163 U.S. at 384. See also Poore, supra note 15, at 53. It should be
emphasized that Talton recognized a very limited tribal sovereignty - that of "local self
government when exercising their tribal functions" - and advised that "thus far" this
limited sovereignty had not yet been subject to the laws of the Union. 163 U.S. at 384
(citing Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641 (1890)).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846); United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
1999
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has also recognized that, pursuant to the Property Clause of the
Constitution, tribes are subject to complete territorial and
political control by the United States. Because of this territorial
control, the Supremacy Clause requires that the Constitution
apply to Indian tribes.
Supreme Court cases prior to Talton did not recognize tribes
as sovereigns. In United States v. Rogers,20 the Court viewed
tribes not as sovereigns, but only as a "race" subject to the
complete control of the United States.21 Even Professor Jensen
recognizes, citing United States v. Kagama,22 that "yes, there
have been Supreme Court cases that can reasonably be
interpreted as denying the existence of any form of tribal
sovereignty."23  In Kagama, the Court recognizes only two
sovereigns - the United States and the states of the Union:
But these Indians are within the geographical limits of the United
States. The soil and the people within these limits are under the
political control of the government of the United States, or of the
states of the Union. There exists within the broad domain of
sovereignty but these two. 24
The Kagama Court, holding that tribes were under the
political control of the government of the United States, relied
both on Rogers and on Chief Justice Marshall's decision in
20. 45 U.S. 567 (1846).
21. Chief Justice Taney wrote:
The native tribes who were found on this continent at the time of its discovery
have never been acknowledged or treated as independent nations by the
European governments, nor regarded as the owners of the territories they
respectively occupied. On the contrary, the whole continent was divided and
parceled out, and granted by the governments of Europe as if it had been
vacant and unoccupied land, and the Indians continually held to be, and
treated as, subject to their dominion and control.
It would be useless at this day to inquire whether the principle thus
adopted is just or not; or to speak of the manner in which the power claimed
was in many instances exercised. It is due to the United States, however, to
say, that while they have maintained the doctrines upon this subject which
had been previously established by other nations, and insisted upon the same
powers and dominion within their territory, yet, from the very moment the
general government came into existence to this time, it has exercised its power
over this unfortunate race ....
45 U.S. at 572.
22. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
23. See Jensen, supra note 1, at 7 & n.20. Professor Jensen also cites Daniel L.
Rotenberg's American Indian Tribal Death - A Centennial Remembrance, 41 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 409 (1986) (acknowledging that Kagama held that tribes did not have sovereignty
but arguing it was wrongly decided).
24. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 379.
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American Ins. Co. v. Canter.25 Both Rogers and American Ins.
Co. assumed that the complete power of the United States to
govern territory is based on its acquiring and holding that
territory.26
Even after Talton, the Supreme Court continued to
recognize the acquisition and holding of territory as a basis for
complete control over Indian tribes. In Federal Power
Commission v. Oregon,27 the Supreme Court held that the
United States, through the Federal Power Commission, had the
power to license dams on Indian reservations. The Court based
its decision on the "ownership and control" of the lands and on
the Property Clause of the United States Constitution:28 "The
Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property
belonging to the United States."29
In a later case, Federal Power Commission v. Tuscaroraol
Indian Nation,30 the Court, citing Federal Power Commission v.
Oregon, relied on the Property Clause as the basis of the United
States' power over Indian territory. The issue was whether the
Federal Power Commission had the authority to condemn tribal
lands. The Court, citing an earlier case sustaining the right of a
government licensee to take Indian lands in derogation of treaty
terms,31 stated:
It would be very strange if the national government, in the
execution of its rightful authority, could exercise the power of
eminent domain in the several states, and could not exercise the
same power in a territory occupied by an Indian nation or tribe,
the members of which were wards of the United States, 32 and
directly subject to its political control. The lands in the Cherokee
territory, like the lands held by private owners everywhere within
the geographical limits of the United States, are held subject to
the authority of the general government to take them for such
objects as are germane to the execution of the powers granted to it,
25. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
26. See Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572; American Ins. Co., 26 U.S. at 543 ("The right to
govern, may be the inevitable consequence of the right to acquire territory.").
27. 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
28. See id. at 443.
29. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
30. 362 U.S. 99 (1960).
31. Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641 (1890) (see supra
note 18 and accompanying text).
32. It is difficult to believe that the United States, as part of its fiduciary
obligations to tribal members, is not obligated to provide them with Constitutional
protections.
1999
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provided only that they are not taken without just compensation
being made to the owner. 33
Because tribes, upon their incorporation into the United
States, had no territory or property, they had no basis for
sovereignty. Beginning with Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in
Johnson v. McIntosh,34 the Supreme Court has held that Indian
tribes do not have ownership and control of lands within the
United States but have only a right of occupancy. 35 In Tee-Hit-
Ton Indians v. United States,36 the Supreme Court held that the
"right of occupancy" described in Johnson v. McIntosh was
subject to taking by the United States without compensation,
because tribes had no property rights which were protected by
the Fifth Amendment.37 Thus tribes legally hold no property or
territory.
Ownership and control of territory is the basis of
sovereignty. In the words of Chief Justice Marshall:
This full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the
attribute of every sovereign, and being incapable of conferring
extra-territorial power, would not seem to contemplate foreign
sovereigns nor their sovereign rights as its objects. 38
33. Tuscaroraol Indian Nation, 362 U.S. at 121-22.
34. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
35. See id. at 585. In the opinion, Chief Justice Marshall states:
While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives, as
occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and
claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power to
grant the soil, while yet in possession of the natives. These grants have been
understood by all, to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian
right of occupancy.
The history of America, from its discovery to the present day, proves, we
think, the universal recognition of these principles.
Id. at 574. Chief Justice Marshall also made it clear that lack of ownership and control
by Indian tribes diminished their sovereignty (see id.) and further indicated that the
United States had the exclusive right to extinguish any Indian right of occupancy (see id.
at 585).
36. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
37. See id. at 285.
38. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812). See
Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 279 (1808) (Marshall, C. J.) (holding that the
rights of sovereignty must be exercised within the territory of the sovereign), overruled
on other grounds, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 281 (1810); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 714,
722-23 (1877) (holding that the sovereignty of a state does not extend beyond its
territory), overruled on other grounds, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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Thus, when tribes were incorporated into the territory of the
United States, they lost their territory,39 and thus their
sovereignty. What remained were tribes within the territory of
the United States, which were subject to the complete
sovereignty of the United States.
Because Indian tribes are not sovereign within the United
States40 and the United States has complete physical and
political control over Indian tribes, Indian tribes may not have
laws or political power inconsistent with the Constitution. The
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution requires such a result.
The Constitution is the supreme law of the United States, and
there may be no law within the United States which is
inconsistent with the Constitution. In the words of Chief Justice
Marshall, "The nullity of any act, or law, inconsistent with the
Constitution, is produced by the declaration, that the
Constitution is the supreme law."41 In McCulloch v. Maryland,42
the Chief Justice made it clear that the Constitution applied to
all subordinate governments:
It is of the very essence of supremacy, to remove all obstacles to its
action within its own sphere, and so to modify every power vested
in subordinate governments, as to exempt its own operations from
their own influence. This effect need not be stated in terms. It is
so involved in the declaration of supremacy, so necessarily implied
in it, that the expression of it could not make it more certain. We
must, therefore, keep it in view, while construing the
constitution.43
There is no question that tribal government is a subordinate
government.44 Thus, the Property Clause and the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution, as interpreted by
Chief Justice Marshall and in later decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, compel the conclusion that tribes may
39. Where Indians or tribes have obtained actual title, that title has been granted
by the United States. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, 348 U.S. at 277-78. Any use of land received
from the United States would likewise be subject to Constitutional restraints. See Poore,
supra note 15, at 69-74.
40. Except to the extent they have been granted limited sovereignty by the United
States, subject to the Constitution. See Poore, supra note 15, at 69-74.
41. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211-12 (1824).
42. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
43. Id. at 427 (emphasis added).
44. Talton itself describes the Cherokee Nation as "subject always to the
paramount authority of the United States .... " 163 U.S. 376, 380 (1896).
1999
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not have powers or laws which are inconsistent with the
Constitution.45
In Rassmussen v. United States,46 the United States
contended that Congress could choose not to apply the
Constitution to the District of Columbia or other territories of
the United States.47 The Court held that the Constitution was
"self-operative" in its application to Territory of the United
States and that Congress did not have the power to change that
result.48  Rather, the Court held the Constitution always
applied:
Without attempting to examine in detail the opinions in the
various cases, in our judgment it clearly results from them that
they substantially rested upon the proposition that where territory
was a part of the United States the inhabitants thereof were
entitled to the guaranties of the 5th, 6th, and 7th Amendments,
and that the act or acts of Congress purporting to extend the
Constitution were considered as declaratory merely of a result
which existed independently by the inherent operation of the
Constitution.49
The inescapable conclusion of these cases is that once tribes
resided in territory which had become part of the United States,
the Constitution limited tribal sovereignty in any way which
was inconsistent with the Constitution. Thus, the Talton
decision was wrong. The "logic" in Talton is inconsistent with
both the Property Clause and the Supremacy Clause. The
Constitution of the United States, in fact, "operated upon" tribal
sovereignty, imposing constitutional requirements.
III. CITIZENSHIP HAS EVERYTHING TO Do WITH IT
Professor Jensen questions why, when Congress made tribal
members citizens of the United States, it necessarily imposed
the Constitution on Indian tribes. He states "[p]erhaps
constitutional protection should apply in tribal courts, but it is
hard to see what the citizenship status of American Indians has
45. The analysis that forms the basis for this conclusion has not been rejected, or
even considered, by Talton or the other cases recognizing the continuing existence of pre-
constitutional sovereignty.
46. 197 U.S. 516 (1905).
47. See id. at 526-27.
48. See id.
49. Id. (emphasis added). Note that the Court speaks of "territory" in general, not
"the territory," as it would of an area which later became a State.
Vol. 60
8
Montana Law Review, Vol. 56 [1995], Iss. 1, Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/9
REPLY TO PROFESSOR JENSEN
to do with that issue."50 As Professor Jensen views the issue,
citizenship provided tribal members only with the right to vote
in state and federal elections and to run for federal office. 51
Indians already had constitutional protections in state and
federal courts because they were "persons."52 He asks: "Does a
Frenchman have to become a U.S. citizen to be entitled to
procedural protections in a U.S. court? Of course not."53
With respect to a tribal member's relationship with his
tribe, this discussion misses the point. Even if we assume,
arguendo, that Talton was correctly decided, 54 and tribes were
still sovereigns which were not required to provide
constitutional protections to their members, that changed when
tribal members became citizens of the United States.
When Congress has the power to provide constitutional
protection for its citizens, it is obligated to do so and is presumed
to do so. Because of Congress' plenary power over Indian tribes,
when it made tribal members citizens of the United States,
Congress was obligated to provide constitutional protections for
those citizens vis-a-vis their tribes. The granting of citizenship
itself provided those protections.
In my initial article I cited Reid v. Covert55 for this
proposition. Reid questioned the constitutionality of agreements
with foreign governments requiring civilian dependents of
military personnel to be tried by courts martial. The Supreme
Court concluded that the Constitution entitled its citizens, even
when abroad, to full constitutional protection. 56 The Court,
rejecting the proposition that constitutional rights of citizens
could be bargained away when dealing with another sovereign,
stated:
Article VI, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution declares:
"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
50. Jensen, supra note 1, at 14.
51. See Jensen, supra note 1, at 13.
52. See Jensen, supra note 1, at 14.
53. See Jensen, supra note 1, at 14.
54. If Talton were not correctly decided, and tribal members already had
Constitutional protections from tribal government, then Professor Jensen may be correct
and being a "person" would be sufficient to provide anyone, including tribal members
and Frenchmen with Constitutional protections as against tribal governments.
55. 354 U.S. 1 (1957); see Poore, supra note 15, at 71.
56. "In summary, we conclude that the Constitution in its entirety applied to the
trials of Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Covert." Reid, 354 U.S. at 18-19 (emphasis added).
1999
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shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land;...."
There is nothing in this language which intimates that
treaties and laws enacted pursuant to them do not have to comply
with the provisions of the Constitution .... It would be manifestly
contrary to the objectives of those who created the Constitution, as
well as those who were responsible for the Bill of Rights - let
alone alien to our entire constitutional history and tradition - to
construe Article VI as permitting the United States to exercise
power under an international agreement without observing
constitutional prohibitions. 57
Reid, therefore, stands for the proposition that if the United
States has the power to provide constitutional protections to its
citizens, it must do so. 58
The Supreme Court and Congress have recognized and
enforced the obligation to provide constitutional protections for
its citizens as against tribes. For example, Congress and the
Supreme Court protect United States citizens from
unconstitutional tribal actions by limiting the tribes' criminal
jurisdiction to tribal members. In Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe,59 the Supreme Court described the requirement
that its citizens' constitutional rights be protected as follows:
The "general object" of the congressional statutes was to allow
Indian nations criminal "jurisdiction of all controversies between
Indians, or where a member of the nation is the only party to the
proceeding, and to reserve to the courts of the United States
jurisdiction of all actions to which its own citizens are parties on
either side."...
[F]rom the formation of the Union and the adoption of the Bill
of Rights, the United States has manifested an equally great
solicitude that its citizens be protected by the United States from
unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty.60
57. Id. at 16-17.
58. Reid, 354 U.S. at 5-7, 16. It should be noted that although Reid was a plurality
opinion, it was followed and broadened by Kinsella v. U.S. ex. rel. Singleton, 361 U.S.
234 (1960). The decision in Kinsella was written by Justice Clark, who wrote the
dissenting opinion in Reid. See Kinsella, 361 U.S. at 241 n.6. Reid was also followed in
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990), discussed infra, notes 85-93 and accompanying
text.
59. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
60. Id. at 204, 209 (quoting In re Mayfield, 141 U.S. 107, 115-16 (1891)) (emphasis
added).
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The Court then concluded that the tribe had no jurisdiction
to try a non-Indian citizen for a crime allegedly committed on
the reservation. 61
I suggest that the reason the United States Supreme Court
did not, from the beginning, require Indian tribes to comply with
the Constitution 62 is that Indian governments were not
considered capable of implementing the Constitution. In
Johnson v. McIntosh,63 Chief Justice Marshall first explained
that, normally, when territory is obtained by conquest, the
people of the territory are integrated into and become citizens of
the conqueror. He then explained why this would not be
possible for Indians:
The title by conquest is acquired and maintained by force. The
conqueror prescribes its limits. Humanity, however, acting on
public opinion, has established, as a general rule, that the
conquered shall not be wantonly oppressed, and that their
condition shall remain as eligible as is compatible with the objects
of the conquest. Most usually, they are incorporated with the
victorious nation, and become subjects or citizens of the
government with which they are connected. The new and old
members of the society mingle with each other; the distinction
between them is gradually lost, and they make one people ....
But the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce
savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was
drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them in possession of their
country, was to leave the country a wilderness; to govern them as a
distinct people, was impossible, because they were as brave and as
high spirited as they were fierce, and were ready to repel by arms
every attempt on their independence. 64
Likewise, in Oliphant, the Court noted that early evidence
concerning tribal jurisdiction over non-members is lacking
because "[u]ntil the middle of this century, few Indian tribes
maintained any semblance of a formal court system."65
Of course, Indians are no longer considered incapable of
participating in constitutional government. Congress recognized
this fact when it granted citizenship to Indians. Indians are
"full citizens."66 They have the same rights as any other
61. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212.
62. Even though required by the decisions cited supra, notes 18-49 and
accompanying text.
63. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
64. Id. at 589-90 (emphasis added).
65. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 197.
66. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990).
1999
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citizen. 67 Tribal members have rights, both as citizens of the
states within which they reside, and as citizens of the United
States.68 They have the right to enforce their constitutional
rights against the state they live in and against the United
States, and courts ought to recognize that they have the same
right as against their tribes.
At the time Congress granted citizenship to Indians,
citizens of the United States were protected from abridgment of
their constitutional rights by a number of federal civil rights
statutes. These included the predecessors to 18 U.S.C. §§ 241
and 242, and the predecessors to 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1982 and
1983.69 In interpreting these statutes, the Supreme Court
consistently held that they were enforceable by citizens of the
United States and by the United States on behalf of its
citizens. 70
For example, in Logan v. United States, the United States
had charged the defendants with criminal interference with the
constitutional rights of citizens of the United States when they
assaulted persons being held for larceny in Indian country. 71
The Supreme Court held that the detained citizens were
properly in the custody of the United States and were entitled to
the protection of their constitutional rights.72 The defendants
argued that the United States did not have the power to protect
these citizens. 73  The Court, reiterating a prior opinion,
responded:
It is argued that the preservation of peace and good order in
society is not within the powers confided to the government of the
United States, but belongs exclusively to the states. Here again
we are met with the theory that the government of the United States
does not rest upon the soil and territory of the country. We think
that this theory is founded on an entire misconception of the nature
and powers of that government. We hold it to be an
incontrovertible principle that the government of the United
67. See Osborne v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 827 (1824)
(indicating that a person who becomes a citizen under an act of Congress possesses all
the constitutional rights of a native citizen).
68. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 843-44 (1995).
69. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 19, 35 Stat. 1088, 1092 (1909); Act of May 31,
1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1871); Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27
(1868); Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1873).
70. See Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1893); United States v. Waddell, 112
U.S. 76 (1884).
71. See Logan, 144 U.S. at 265.
72. See id. at 285.
73. See id. at 267-68.
Vol. 60
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States may, be [sic] means of physical force, exercised through its
official agents, execute on every foot of American soil the powers
and functions that belong to it. This necessarily involves the
power to command obedience to its laws, and hence the power to
keep the peace to that extent.
74
In United States v. Waddell,75 the Supreme Court held that
one of these civil rights statutes could be used to prosecute
individuals who were attempting to prevent a citizen from
establishing a homestead under the Homestead Act. When the
authority of the United States to protect this citizen was
questioned, the Court responded:
It would, indeed, be strange if the United States, under the
[Property Clause], being the owner of unsettled lands larger in
area than the most powerful kingdoms of Europe, and having the
power "to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations
respecting this territory," cannot make a law which protects a
party in the performance of his existing contract for the purchase
of such land, without which the contract fails, and the rights, both
of the United States and the purchaser, are defeated.
76
These statutes provided constitutional protections for
citizens of the United States "on every foot of American soil."
Even without Congressional action, the Constitution itself
creates remedies for its citizens to redress the unconstitutional
use of power. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 77 the
Court held that explicit Congressional authorization was not a
prerequisite to the power of a federal court to enforce the
Constitution.78  The plaintiff sued federal agents for
perpetrating an unconstitutional search and arrest. Both the
district and the circuit court held that the complaint failed to
state a cause of action.7 9  In reversing, the Court stated:
"[W]here federally protected rights have been invaded, it has
been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to
adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief."8 0 And,
as discussed in the re-analysis of Talton 8 the Court in
74. Id. at 294-95 (quoting Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 371, 394 (1879))
(emphasis added).
75. 112 U.S. 76(1884).
76. Id. at 80-81.
77. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
78. See id. at 397.
79. See id. at 390.
80. Id. at 392 (citations omitted).
81. See supra, notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
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Rassmussen v. United States8 2 held that the Constitution applies
to all territory of the United States by the "inherent operation"8 3
and the "self-operative application"84 of the Constitution. The
constitutional rights of citizens of the United States are
protected on every foot of territory of the United States.
This principle was enforced on Indian reservations and
against a tribal government in Duro v. Reina.8 5 In Duro, the
issue was whether an Indian who was not a tribal member, but
who was a citizen of the United States,8 6 could be tried in a
tribal court which might not provide constitutional protections.8 7
The Court held that an Indian citizen of the United States could
not be subject to trial without constitutional protections. The
Court stated, "[o]ur cases suggest constitutional limitations even
on the ability of Congress to subject American citizens to
criminal proceedings before a tribunal that does not provide
constitutional protections as a matter of right."88 The Court, in
reaching its conclusion, also recognized that any powers received
by a tribe from Congress would be "subject to the constraints of
the Constitution."8 9
Having recognized that tribes may at times act in an
unconstitutional manner or not be required to provide full
constitutional protections, the Court, addressing rights of tribal
member citizens then stated, in dicta:
Tribal authority over members, who are also citizens, is not
subject to these objections. Retained criminal jurisdiction over
members is accepted by our precedents and justified by the
voluntary character of tribal membership and the concomitant
right of participation in tribal government, the authority of which
rests on consent.90
This dicta is where the Court's logic fails. In my initial
article, I cited Johnson v. Zerbst9' for the proposition that courts
do not presume or assume waiver of constitutional rights. The
effect of this dicta is the presumption that because an American
82. 197 U.S. 516 (1905).
83. Id. at 526.
84. Id. at 527.
85. 495 U.S. 676(1990).
86. See id. at 692-93.
87. See id. at 693.
88. Id. (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)).
89. Duro, 495 U.S. at 686.
90. Id. at 694.
91. 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); see Poore, supra note 15, at 60 n.49.
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citizen is born as a tribal member on a reservation, he or. she
acquiesces to unconstitutional tribal government. 92  Such
acquiescence is obviously a fiction and contrary to Johnson.
What is more important, however, is that this dicta in Duro
ignores some of the most fundamental constitutional precepts.
Constitutions protect the minority against the will of the
majority. The dicta in Duro implies that Indian citizens of the
United States may be entitled to constitutional protections, but
they may not have them if they lack sufficient votes to elect
those who will grant them those protections. This is not right.
As Chief Justice Warren stated, "[o]ne's right to life, liberty and
property.., and other fundamental rights may not be submitted
to a vote, may depend on the outcome of no elections. A citizens'
constitutional rights can hardly be infringed simply because a
majority of the people choose that it be."93
The United States has the power and the obligation to
protect its citizens' constitutional rights. Because Congress
opened up Indian reservations for settlement by non-Indian
citizens, and because Congress, pursuant to Article I of the
Constitution, granted citizenship to tribal members, virtually all
individuals living on, passing through, or doing business on
Indian reservations are citizens of the United States. Over
citizens of the United States, tribes have no power which is not
subject to the Constitution.
When Congress provided that citizens could travel through
and occupy Indian reservations and when it granted United
States citizenship to tribal members, it diminished tribal
sovereignty to the extent that sovereignty was inconsistent with
citizenship. In Nevada v. Hall,94 the Court recognized that the
rights of citizens limit sovereignty. The Court stated, "[Tlhe
citizens in each state are entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several states .... [E]ach of these
92. It is interesting that the Duro Court's presumption that a citizen/tribal
member waives his constitutional rights as against his tribal government is surprisingly
similar to the "contacts" waiver test posited by the Court of Appeals to determine which
non-member Indians might be subject to tribal jurisdiction. In rejecting this approach
the Court stated that "The contacts approach is little more than a variation of the
argument that any person who enters an Indian community should be deemed to have
given implied consent to tribal criminal jurisdiction over him. We have rejected this
approach for non-Indians." Duro, 495 U.S. at 695.
93. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of the State of Colorado, 377 U.S.
713, 736-37 (1964) (emphasis added). Cf Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) ("A
State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws.").
94. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
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provisions places a specific limitation on the sovereignty of the
several states."95 If citizenship diminishes the sovereignty of
states, it likewise certainly diminishes the sovereignty of
tribes.9 6  Congress, when it granted citizenship to tribal
members, diminished the sovereignty of states, because states
were required to accommodate the constitutional rights of their
new citizens. It is clear that tribes were required to do the
same.
97
The issue here is not whether a Frenchman would have
constitutional rights in a federal or state court. The question
here is whether citizens of the United States have constitutional
rights in tribal courts and with respect to tribal government.
The answer is that they do.98
Professor Jensen debates whether imposing the
Constitution on tribes would have some of the impacts I describe
in my initial article. For example, I asserted that non-tribal
members governed by a tribe living on a reservation should be
entitled to vote in tribal elections. 99  Jensen responds "Where
does the Constitution say that?"100 To respond in the words of
the Supreme Court, "[i]n decision after decision, this Court has
made clear that a citizen has a constitutionally protected right
to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens
in the jurisdiction. "1 1
95. Id. at 425.
96. The granting of citizenship is a diminishment of both state and tribal
sovereignty by congressional action pursuant to Article I. While the sovereignty of states
normally cannot be diminished by congressional act, the sovereignty of tribes can be.
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (stating that Congress has limited
authority to change the sovereignty of states); Wheeler v. U. S., 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978)
(stating that tribes have yielded up sovereign powers by statute pursuant to the plenary
power of Congress.)
97. It is ironic that Professor Jensen assumes that when Congress granted
citizenship to tribal members, these citizens received constitutional rights as against
states, but not as against their own tribes. He also contends that state sovereignty was
diminished in that states were forced to allow these tribal citizens the Constitutional
right to vote in state elections, yet he does not recognize a similar constitutional right for
non-Indian citizens living on reservations to vote in tribal elections.
98. It took almost 60 years for the rights of citizens ignored in Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896), decided the same day as Talton, to be recognized by the Court in
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Sometimes courts do not immediately
recognize the rights of citizens. The Court has not yet completely recognized these
rights, but they are rights required by the Constitution.
99. See Poore, supra note 15, at 77.
100. Jensen, supra note 1, at 13.
101. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972).
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Professor Jensen argues that tribes can discriminate on the
basis of race, citing Morton v. Mancari.10 2 Morton, however, was
decided before Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena0 3 made it
clear that the federal (and thus tribal) standard for equal
protection was the same as the standard established for states
by the Fourteenth Amendment. 0 4 In addition, the Morton court
itself indicated that employment criteria issues were not decided
on the basis of race. Rather, the Court stated, "[t]he preference,
as applied, is granted to Indians not as a discreet racial group,
but rather as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose
lives and activities are governed by the BIA in a unique
fashion." 05  The "logic" of Morton in fact supports the
proposition that citizens should have a right to be involved in
the selection of those who govern their lives, because the Court
compared the employment preference to a residency
requirement: "[tihe preference is similar in kind to the
constitutional requirement that a United States Senator, when
elected, be 'an inhabitant of the state for which he shall be
chosen,'... or that a member of a city council reside within the
city governed by the council."10 6
Explaining why Indian tribes are not subject to the
Constitution, Professor Jensen states: "Like it or not, Indian
tribes have a special constitutional status.' 0 7 It is true that
Indians and tribes have had a unique status, probably arising
from the Indian Commerce Clause. 08 The Supreme Court,
however, has made it clear that the Indian Commerce Clause
does not give tribes super-constitutional rights. For example,
the Court has held that the Clause cannot be used to circumvent
the Eleventh Amendment's limitations on federal jurisdiction. 10 9
Similarly, it has held that the First Amendment must apply to
all citizens alike, even if the result is devastating to traditional
102. 417 U.S. 535 (1974); see also Jensen, supra note 1, at n.55.
103. 515 U.S. 200(1995).
104. See id. at 225.
105. Morton, 417 U.S. at 554.
106. Id. at 554 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3).
107. Jensen, supra note 1, at 11.
108. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8 gives to Congress the power "to regulate Commerce
with Foreign Nations and among the Several States, and with Indian Tribes."
109. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996).
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Indian religious practices.1 0 Whatever the status of Indian
tribes, it is not sufficient to overcome the rights of citizens."'
IV. CONCLUSION
On today's reservations, every citizen, Indian and non-
Indian, may participate equally in federal and state government.
All may vote in state elections. All may vote in national
elections. All may run for local and state offices. All may run for
Congress. All may run for President. Yet only a select few
citizens may participate in tribal government.
All citizens are entitled to have their constitutional rights
protected on every square foot of American soil. Indian tribes
function within the United States and are subject to its complete
control. The precedents of the Supreme Court and the language
of the Constitution itself therefore require that citizens be
protected from unconstitutional power and actions by Indian
tribes. Tribes must function subject to the Constitution of the
United States. The Constitution and logic require this result.
Courts must begin to protect citizens from unconstitutional
exercises of powers by tribes. This obligation cannot be
entrusted solely to Congress." 2  Whatever may be the
traditional way of looking at things, the fact is and always has
been that the Constitution applies to Indian tribes.
110. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Assn., 485 U.S. 439, 452
(1988).
111. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6-7, 17 (1954); see also supra, notes 55-58 and
accompanying text.
112. But cf. Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Techs., Inc., 118 S.Ct. 1700,
1705 (1998) (recognizing that the Court's decisions with respect to tribal immunity from
suit may be flawed but stating that the remedy must come from Congress). Congress,
however, must set up and fund mechanisms necessary to accomplish constitutional
protections.
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